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ROBINSON v. CITY OF EDMOND: ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND A CASE FOR
GOVERNMENTAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
THE IUSTORICAL ROLE OF RELIGION
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of religion in the founding and history of America is unques-
tioned. Also unquestioned is the intent of our forefathers to prohibit governmen-
tal establishment of a national religion.' But was the gap between church and
state intended to be filled by a "high and impregnable"2 wall?
In January 1993, five residents of Edmond, Oklahoma3 filed a lawsuit in
the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against
the City claiming violations of both federal and state constitutional law.' Rob-
inson v. City of Edmond' was the culmination of a growing dispute among citi-
zens concerning the city seal of Edmond and what some perceived as a gov-
ernmental endorsement (or establishment) of Christianity as the preferred reli-
gion of the City.
What was the City's egregious step toward the prohibited area of govern-
mental establishment of religion? One of four quadrants of its seal depicted a
Latin or Christian cross.6 At trial, the district court entered judgment in favor
of the City, finding that no violation of either federal or state constitutional law
had occurred.7
The plaintiffs appealed. Robinson represented the third occasion for the
Tenth Circuit to review the constitutionality of a city seal bearing religious
symbols.' In each instance, applying the highly-criticized three pronged test
1. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
2. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. See also infra notes 165-80 and accompanying text.
3. Edmond, Oklahoma is a primarily residential city located in central Oklahoma and north of Oklaho-
ma City.
4. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, No. CIV-93-153-R, mem. op. at 1 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 1994).
Plaintiffs claimed a violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and violation of Arti-
cle II, Section 5 of the Oklahoma Constitution. See id.
5. 68 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1702 (1996).
6. See id. at 1228. The seal is reproduced infra p. 632.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 1230. The Tenth Circuit previously found depiction of a Latin cross upon a county seal
violative of the Establishment Clause in Friedman v. Board of County Commissioners, 781 F.2d 777 (10th
Cir. 1985) (en banc), and likewise ruled depiction of a local church building upon a city seal violated the
Establishment Clause in Foremaster v. City of St. George, 882 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989). See infra text
accompanying notes 83-99.
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derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman,9 the Tenth Circuit ruled the seal violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
By a 6-3 vote," one vote shy of the four needed for review, the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, expressed the need for the
Court to settle the growing conflict among lower courts concerning display of
religious symbols on government seals. 2 Rehnquist noted that the Seventh Cir-
cuit, in Harris v. City of Zion, 3 likewise had determined religious depictions
on city seals unconstitutional, and also followed the Lemon test to reach such a
decision. 4 Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit, in Murray v. City of Austin, 5 had
reached an opposite conclusion without specific reliance on Lemon, 6 although
noting that the seal of Austin would have met the three-prong test. 7 The Chief
Justice further expressed a desire to resolve a split among appellate courts con-
cerning the proper requirements for standing to sue, 8 and further questioned
whether the plaintiffs in Robinson had suffered sufficient injury to justify stand-
ing,19 as the Tenth Circuit only briefly mentioned this issue.0
As a result of the judgment against Edmond, the City now faces substantial
expenses in altering the city insignia2' and paying legal expenses, including
those incurred by the plaintiffs.' Foregoing the more costly option of a com-
plete redesign, the City decided to leave the unconstitutional quadrant empty.'
9. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
10. The Establishment Clause is that portion of the First Amendment which reads, "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion," while the Free Exercise Clause is the second portion of the
provision which states, ". . . or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
11. See Robinson, 116 S. Ct. at 1702 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
12. See id. at 1702-03. Numerous other cases have dealt with varying forms of religious symbols upon
public property with varying results from the courts. See e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (holding a privately owned creche displayed at county courthouse during holiday season is unconstitu-
tional when displayed without surrounding secular symbols); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (hold-
ing a publicly ok'ned creche does not violate Establishment Clause when displayed in holiday season).
13. 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991).
14. See Robinson, 116 S. Ct. at 1703 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991).
16. See id. at 158.
17. See id.
18. See Robinson, 116 S. Ct. at 1703 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19. See id. Although neither the district court nor the appellate court made any detailed reference to
"injury" suffered, the plaintiffs' attorney, Michael Salem of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
asserted that the record provided substantial evidence for standing and further included testimony of one
plaintiff, Martin Feldman, who allegedly drove out of his way to avoid seeing the seal. See Chris Casteel,
High Court Rejects Edmond Cross Seal Ruling Appeal Refused, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 14, 1996, at
1.
20. The court pointed out that standing is always necessary when dealing with Establishment Clause
challenges, but referenced the lack of dispute between the parties concerning plaintiffs' standing to sue. See
Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1229 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. CL 1702 (1996).
However, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the court made no reference to any evidence concerning
plaintiffs' claim of injury other than stating that "[plaintiffs are non-Christians who live or work in Edmond."
See Robinson, 116 S. Ct. at 1703 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1228).
21. See High Court Rejects Edmond Cross Plaintiff Celebrates; Mayor Displeased, ThE DAILY OKLA-
HOMAN, May 14, 1996 at I [hereinafter High Court Rejects]. See infra text accompanying note 267.
22. See id. See also infra text accompanying note 268.
23. See Blank Space on Seal Approved, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 1, 1996, at 11.
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While few will question that no monetary price can be placed upon the
value of our religious freedoms, the inconsistencies24 and scrutiny of minuti-
aes which have resulted from Lemon and its progeny continue to raise the
question of whether our current Establishment Clause jurisprudence is grounded
upon the proper foundation. Again, did our forefathers intend to build a "high
and impregnable" wall separating church and state?
This note discusses the intriguing facts and law surrounding Robinson.
Additionally, this note illustrates that in the quest for a consistent standard and
interpretation of the Religious Clauses, the Supreme Court must reexamine the
origins of the Religious Clauses, the actions of our forefathers following adop-
tion of these clauses, and the extent to which they should be applied today.'
Further, this note contends that such reexamination is necessitated by current
interpretations of the Establishment Clause which generally result in a prefer-
ence for non-religion over religion and frequently require denial of the historical
role played by religion in the development of our states and local communities,
results never intended by the authors of the First Amendment.'
II. ROBINSON V. CITY OF EDMOND
A. Statement of Facts and Trial Court Ruling
Robinson arose from a dispute concerning the official seal of the City of
Edmond. The circular seal, adopted in 1965, had a center portion depicting
24. See infra note 191.
25. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674-76 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), where Justice Kennedy criticizes the law asserted by Justice Blackmnun concerning public
displays of religious symbols during the holiday season. According to Justice Kennedy, reviewing courts will
be relegated to considering whether secular symbols such as Santas and reindeer were included, measuring the
distance between religious and secular symbols, and ensuring that municipal greenery is not used to form
floral frames for religious symbols. Therefore, Establishment Clause jurisprudence concerning religious sym-
bols essentially finds the court "using little more than intuition and a tape measure." Id. at 675. Judge
Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit likewise levels criticism by stating, "[i]t would be appalling to conduct
litigation under the Establishment Clause ... with.., witnesses testifying that they were offended-but
would have been less so were the creche five feet closer to the jumbo candy cane." American Jewish Con-
gress v. Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 130 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
26. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist became the first justice to provide such reexamina-
tion of the history of the First Amendment in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
27. The Supreme Court holds that government cannot favor religion over non-religion. See Allegheny,
492 U.S. at 593 (1989). Likewise, Justice Douglas previously expressed similar forbiddance of governmental
indifference toward the role of religion throughout the history of the United States and in the lives of its peo-
ple, by stating:
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.... When the state en-
courages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of
public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious
nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may
not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show a callous indiffer-
ence to religious groups. That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those who
do believe .... [We find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to
be hostile to... religious influence.
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (emphasis added).
28. The city seal, intended for identification of city property and personnel, was designed by local resi-
dent Frances Bryan and chosen as a result of a local contest. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, No. CIV-93-
3
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two hands shaking while the remaining area broke into four equal quadrants,
each containing emblems or symbols which corresponded with the history of
the City: one contained a steam engine and oil derricks,29 one contained the lo-
cal landmark Old North Tower," one contained a covered wagon in front of
the number 1889,"' while the final quadrant contained a Latin or Christian
cross. 2 The seal represented the official insignia of the City and appeared on
signs, flags, vehicle, uniforms, stationary, utility bills, and the walls of the City
Council chambers.33
The suit involved five non-Christian plaintiffs who either lived or worked
in Edmond, Oklahoma.34 The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against the City.35 Included as plaintiffs were: Dr. Wayne Robinson, the minis-
ter of the Channing Unitarian Church in Edmond;36 Curtis Battles and Wendell
Miller, members of the Unitarian Congregation and residents of the City;37
Martin Feldman, a Jewish resident;" and Barbara Orza, who was dismissed by
the district court due to unavailability at trial.39 The defendants were the City,
its mayor individually and in his official capacity, and the city council mem-
bers, again, as individuals and in their official capacities.' Eventually, the dis-
trict court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the mayor and city council
members as individuals.4
The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983, claiming a violation of the
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Oklahoma Constitu-
tion.42 The district court granted partial summary judgment for the City on the
Free Exercise claim and its counterpart in the Oklahoma Constitution.43 Fol-
153-R, mem. op. at 1-2 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 1994). The contest sought the seal which best portrayed the
history and background of the city and further suggested references to the city's "birth in the Run of '89, the
college and the culture, commerce, agriculture and downright friendliness of the city." Id.
29. See id. at 2. This section was intended to represent commerce. See Bobby Ross Jr. & Lisa Beckloff,
Ednond Cross Ruling Eyed Other Cities May Be Affected, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 23, 1995, at I
[hereinafter Edmond Cross Ruling].
30. See Robinson, No. CIV-93-153-R, at 2. This section was intended to represent education. The Old
North Tower is a local historical landmark located on the campus of the University of Central Oklahoma in
Edmond. See Edmnond Cross Ruling, supra note 29. The Old North Tower is where the first higher education
classes were held in Oklahoma Territory. See Robinson, No. CIV-93-153-R, at 4.
31. See Robinson, No. CIV-93-153-R, at 2. This section was intended to represent the use of covered
wagons in the Oklahoma Land Run of 1889, the birth of settlement in Edmond. See id. at 4.
32. See id. This section was intended to represent the role of religion, and specifically Christian church-
es, in the history of Edmond. See id. at 4-5. See also infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
33. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1702
(1996).
34. See id. at 1228.
35. See id.
36. See id. It is worth noting that Dr. Robinson, seemingly the primary plaintiff in this case and certainly
the most publicly outspoken party throughout the controversy, left Edmond prior to denial of certiorari by the
Supreme Court. Dr. Robinson moved to become minister at the First Universalist Church of Minneapolis. See
High Court Rejects, supra note 21, at 1.
37. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1228.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 1228 n.1.
40. See id. at 1228.
41. See id.
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lowing a two day trial, Judge David L. Russell" granted judgment for the
City.45 Although failing to explain his finding of validity under the Oklahoma
Constitution,' Judge Russell applied the Lemon test in ruling that the seal did
not violate the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution.47 While
the district court based its ruling on Lemon, it included a modification taken
from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU."
Since 1971, Lemon has generally been utilized in Establishment Clause
cases despite extensive criticism, specifically regarding the difficulty of its
application and the inconsistency of its results.49 For government action to be
upheld under Lemon, it must (1) have a secular purpose, (2) have a principal or
primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) avoid fos-
tering excessive government entanglement with religion." The O'Connor mod-
ification utilized by the district court concerns the first two prongs of the test
and calls for viewing the effects of the government action as perceived by an
average observer.5'
In ruling for the City, the district court admitted that the cross obviously
brings a religious implication when viewed in isolation5 2 The court continued,
however, by emphasizing the totality of judicial scrutiny, noting "[ylou cannot
look at this seal from just one quadrant."'53 Judge Russell's opinion turned on
the combination of secular symbols mixed with the religious symbol and the
historical representation of each quadrant.54 While the other quadrants repre-
sented commerce, education, and the settlement of the City, the cross summa-
rized the role played by religion in the founding, development, and history of
Edmond."5 At trial, the City argued, and supported with testimony, that within
months of the Oklahoma Land Run, four churches had established themselves
in Edmond and played an important role in the growth of Edmond. 6 The City
further pointed out that Edmond was the home of the first church established in
the Oklahoma Territory following the Land Run, St. John the Baptist Catholic
Church.57
44. Judge Russell is Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklaho-
ma.
45. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1228. -
46. See id.
47. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, No. CIV-93-153-R, mer. op. at 3 (W.D. Okla. June 1, 1994).
48. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
49. See infra note 191.
50. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
51. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1229-30.
52. See Robinson, No. CIV-93-153-R, at 5.
53. See Bobby Ross Jr., Seal's Cross Depicts History, Judge Says, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, May 26,
1994, at 1 [hereinafter Seal's Cross Depicts History].
54. See Robinson, No. CIV-93-153-R, at 4-5.
55. Judge Russell found, "Religion is a part of Edmond's history as are railroads, covered wagons,
schools and the land run." Id. at 5.
56. See Seal's Cross Depicts History, supra note 53 at 1. The original designer of the seal, Frances
Bryan, testified that she included the cross as tribute to the prominent role of churches during the origins of
Edmond. See id.
57. See Robinson, No. CIV-93-153-R, at 4-5. See also High Court Rejects, supra note 21, at 1.
1997]
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The district court further relied on the duration of time which had passed
without complaint from citizens. 8 The court noted the passage of "almost
twenty-five years before anyone seemed to notice the cross was there."'59 The
plaintiffs themselves testified that they resided in Edmond for years before
realizing that the cross was displayed upon the seal.' The court found such an
uncontroversial span of time "significant when considering the perception of the
average observer."' In the end, the district court was convinced that the cross
on Edmond's city seal did not have the effect of endorsing religion, nor was it
intended to endorse religion.62 The court concluded that the Constitution, while
prohibiting the establishment of religion, does not require government to ignore
the existence of religion. 3
B. Tenth Circuit Appeal
Following judgment for the City, plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals. On appeal, the case had been narrowed to payment of attor-
ney fees' and the issue of violation of the First Amendment's Establishment
Clause.' Yet another consideration of Lemon was in order.
As stated earlier, the Fifth and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have
heard similar cases.' The Fifth Circuit, in Murray v. City of Austin,67 became
the only federal appellate court to allow a religious symbol to remain on a city
seal.' Incorporating a modified version of Stephen F. Austin's family coat of
arms,69 the City adopted the seal in 1916. The final version depicted a small
Latin cross between outspread wings" and atop a pentagon containing a lamp
of knowledge.7 The district court granted summary judgment for the City,72
and the Fifth Circuit upheld the ruling based upon the history, purpose, and
context of the seal. 3 Although refusing to directly rely upon Lemon, the court
58. See Robinson, No. CIV-93-153-R, at 2.
59. Seal's Cross Depicts History, supra note 53, at 1.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See Robinson, No. CIV-93-153-R, at 5.
63. See id.
64. This note does not directly analyze the issue of attorney fees. However, the analysis does reveal the
burden that payment of such fees is likely to place upon cities in future litigation. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 267-68.
65. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1228-29 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1702 (1996).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17.
67. 947 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1991). Reproduction of the city's seal is included in the opinion at page 159.
68. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1232.
69. The City of Austin was named after Stephen F. Austin who is known as the "father of Texas." See
Murray, 947 F.2d at 149.
70. "The Latin cross in the coat of arms signified that a progenitor had participated in a crusade; and the
wings represented St. Austin... the Archbishop of Canterbury." Id. at 149.
71. Intended to represent "the educational advantages of the City" such as the University of Texas locat-
ed in Austin. Id. at 149.
72. See Murray v. City of Austin, 744 F. Supp. 771, 775-76 (W.D. Tex. 1990), affd., 947 F.2d 147 (5th
Cir. 1991).
73. See Murray, 947 F.2d at 154-58.
[Vol. 32:605
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ruled that Austin's seal would have passed the three-prong test because the
principal or primary effect of the insignia was not to advance or inhibit religion
but rather had the "effect of identifying city activity and property and promot-
ing Austin's unique role and history."74
Conversely, the Seventh Circuit, in Harris v. City of Zion,75 reviewed two
city seals76 and found both violated the Establishment Clause. The seal of
Rolling Meadows, Illinois, contained a four-leaf clover which depicted inside
each leaf a water tower, two industrial buildings, a leaf, and a tall, slender cross
in front of a one story building.' The seal of Zion, Illinois, presented a shield
topped by the statement "God Reigns" and divided into four portions containing
a dove, a Christian cross, a crown and scepter, and the name "Zion." ' The
district court79 allowed the Rolling Meadows seal to stand, but found the Zion
seal to be in violation of the Establishment Clause because of its effect of en-
dorsing religion.' Following a consolidated review of both seals, the Seventh
Circuit found the crosses to be "blatantly sectarian" and more than "mere com-
memoration" while "effectively endors[ing] or promot[ing] the Christian
faith."'" The court expressly rejected the arguments of historical representation
and detraction by the secular symbols away from the religious symbols.82
Robinson, however, represented the third review by the Tenth Circuit of a
governmental seal bearing religious symbols." In Friedman v. Board of Coun-
ty Commissioners of Bernalillo County,4 the seal of Bemalillo County, New
Mexico, conveyed the Spanish motto "CON ESTA VENCEMOS" ("With This
We Conquer" or "With This We Overcome")s and centered around a Latin
cross emanating rays of light above mountains and sheep grazing on a
plain." The district courts8 ruled in favor of the County based upon its con-
74. Id. at 155.
75. 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir. 1991). Reproduction of the cities' seals are included in the appendix to the
opinion at pages 1416-17.
76. Two trials were consolidated for trial by the district court. See id. at 1402.
77. The one story building is actually a depiction of a local church. See id. at 1403.
78. See id. at 1417. The City of Zion was founded in 1896 by the Reverend John Alexander Dowie,
founder of the Christian Catholic Church. See id. at 1403. The city was originally intended as a "religious
utopian community." Id. at 1424 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The city seal was then adopted in 1902 and
since retained by city council vote in 1986 based upon historical reasoning. See id. at 1413-14.
79. See Harris v. City of Zion, 729 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd., 927 F.2d 1401 (7th Cir.
1991).
80. See id. at 1249-50.
81. Harris, 927 F.2d at 1415.
82. See id.
83. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1230-31 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
1702 (1996). See also supra note 8.
84. 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc). Reproduction of the county's seal is included in the appen-
dix to the opinion at pages 783-84.
85. Id. at 779. Conflicting testimony was given at trial as to whether the statement "With This We Con-
quer" referred to the cross or to the seal itself. See id.
86. Testimony revealed a nearly unanimous opinion that the cross represented the historical role played
by Catholicism, Christianity, and the Spanish conquistadors in the settlement of the Southwest and New Mex-
ico. See id.
87. Interpretation of the symbolism represented by the sheep differed between the parties. The plaintiff
testified that he saw the sheep as representing the "flock of Jesus." Id. However, the defendants brought forth
experts testifying the sheep merely symbolized the historical role of the sheep-raising industry in the county,
1997]
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tention that the cross represented the historical role which the Catholic Church
had played in the settling of the Southwest. 9 Further, the court found the seal
to be a historical symbol rather than an expression of religion.'
Original review by the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court holding. On
rehearing, however, the court, sitting en bane, reversed, ruling that the seal
violated the Establishment Clause by endorsing Christianity.9 Specifically, the
court found that an average observer would conclude the seal's primary or
principal effect was the advancement of religion.'
Similarly, in Foremaster v. City of St. George,' the seal of St. George,
Utah depicted the temple of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints in
the lower bottom quarter.9" A putting green accompanied the sketch of the
temple, and a hill dominated the bottom half while the upper half contained a
setting sun and a cluster of grapes.95 The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the City holding that the symbol of the temple did not
have the primary effect of endorsing the church.' The Tenth Circuit reversed
and remanded, ruling that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to the
perception of an average observer when viewing the city logo." Although the
appellate court did not make a specific ruling on the constitutionality of the
seal, it focused on the second prong of the Lemon test which holds a govern-
and directly denied any symbolism connected to Christianity. See id.
88. See Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bemalillo County, 528 F. Supp. 919 (D.N.M. 1981),
rev'd sub. nom. Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bemalillo County, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985)
(en banc).
89. See id. at 925. The court noted further support for the county's "historical" argument by citing other
vestiges of religious symbolism left by Catholicism or Christianity upon the state:
Catholicism cannot be separated from New Mexico history. Catholicism is as much of New Mexico
history as the conquistadors who explored this area and named the State capital "Santa Fe", which
translated means "the City of the Holy Faith", and named our beautiful mountain range "Sangre de
Cristo", which translated means "the blood of Christ"
Id. at 924.
90. See id. at 925.
91. See Friedman, 781 F.2d at 780-82.
92. See id. "Primary effect" of "advanc[ing] religion" is the second prong of the Lemon test. See Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). Plaintiffs' evidence persuaded the court in Friedman that an average
observer would conclude the county government was "advertising" Catholicism through the depiction of the
cross upon the county seal. See Friedman, 781 F.2d at 781.
93. 882 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1989). Reproduction of the city's seal is included in the appendix to the
opinion. See id. at 1493.
94. See id. at 1486. Local tradition holds that the Mormon Temple stands upon ground dedicated by
Brigham Young. The temple was the first of its kind in the West and has since become a tourist attraction
with a visitors center on the surrounding public grounds. See id.
95. See id. The seal also included the motto "Where the Summer Sun Spends the Winter" emblazoned
across the middle. Id.
96. See Foremaster v. City of St. George, 655 F. Supp. 844 (D. Utah 1987), rev'd., 882 F.2d 1485 (10th
Cir. 1989).
97. See id. at 852. The plaintiff also challenged the constitutionality, under the Establishment Clause, of
a city utility subsidy for the temple. See Foremaster, 882 F.2d at 1486. Since 1942, the city's Utility Depart-
ment had credited the temple's monthly electric bill to help cut the cost of illuminating the temple at night.
See id. Although the district court ruled that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue, the Tenth Circuit reversed,
finding that the plaintiff suffered economic harm. See id. at 1488.
98. See Foremaster, 882 F.2d at 1490-91.
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mental action violates the Establishment Clause if the action has a primary
effect of advancing religion."
The Robinson court relied heavily on Foremaster and Friedman along with
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Harris."° After narrowing the issues to the
Establishment Clause inquiry, review was further limited to the second prong of
the Lemon test, which is concerned with the "effect" of governmental ac-
tion.'"' In determining the effect, the court looked at the "particular physical
setting[]"'" of the seal and evaluated the effect based upon the objective view
of an average observer. Further, the court noted that its ruling in Friedman
took into consideration "the seal's compqsition and use"'" and "its pervasive-
ness" into the everyday lives of residents."
The City brought forth three main arguments, all of which were summarily
rejected. First, the City argued that the seal represented the history of
Edmond."° The court quickly rejected this argument by noting the sectarian
nature of the Christian cross and contending success of such an argument would
essentially negate the Establishment Clause because religion is prominent in
many communities."° Additionally, the court noted the intent behind the seal
and its symbols is irrelevant if the average observer would interpret the seal as
advancing religion.' 8
Second, the City argued that the majority of the residents of Edmond, both
Christian and non-Christian, did not believe the seal endorsed religion." 9 The
court ruled that this argument made a false assumption of law and explained
that the objective view is based on an average observer, not the local communi-
ty."' In the court's opinion, an average observer viewing the Edmond seal
necessarily perceived that the City of Edmond endorsed Christianity.'
Finally, the City argued that one can distinguish the Edmond seal from
those which have been found unconstitutional as its inclusion of secular sym-
bols neutralized any religious connotation given to the seal through depiction of
the cross."' By denying the City's third, and.possibly strongest argument, the
court refused "to carefully and minutely distinguish the Edmond seal ... based
upon the particular dimensions of the cross[] ... or the secular or non-secular
nature of other elements of the seal.""' 3 With dismissal of the final defense
99. See id. at 1491.
100. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1230-33 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
1702 (1996).
101. See id. at 1229-30.
102. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989).
103. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo Coun-
ty, 781 F.2d 777, 781 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
104. Id. (quoting Friedman, 781 F.2d at 782).
105. Id. at 1231 (quoting Friedman, 781 F.2d at 782).




110. See id. at 1232-33.
111. See id. at 1233.
112. See id.
113. Id. But cf. Murray v. City of Austin, 947 F.2d 147, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1991); id. at 169-70 (Goldberg,
19971
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argument, the court concluded that Edmond's usage of a Christian cross on its
city seal violated the Establishment Clause."4
C. Certiorari Denied - Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissenting Opinion
Sounding the death knell for the Edmond city seal, the Supreme Court
narrowly voted to deny certiorari, leaving the City merely one vote short of
review."' Denial of certiorari in Robinson illustrates the division of the Court
over the current status of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. However, Chief
Justice Rehnquist seized the opportunity in a brief dissent to express both his
concern over potential flaws in the Tenth Circuit's opinion as well as his desire
to resolve the developing conflicts among lower courts in dealing with religious
symbols upon government property in general." 6
Ill. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. First Amendment Origins and History
James Madison has been considered the Father of the United States Consti-
tution."7 Despite his eventually extensive involvement in development of the
Bill of Rights, Madison was not at the forefront of those who demanded an
inclusion of specific protections for individual rights into the Constitution."'
Despite generally favoring a Bill of Rights, Madison expressed various doubts
about the need or usefulness of such an addition to the proposed Constitution
and opined that he "never thought the omission a material defect.""..9 Primari-
ly, he was satisfied that the Constitution, through the powers given to the feder-
al government," ° sufficiently provided for protection of individual rights
against federal government encroachment. 2 ' Coupled with the limitations
placed upon the federal government, Madison believed that the size of the
country would diminish the possibilities of a single-minded majority being
formed to a sufficient degree as to attain the power required for oppression of
minority groups.'" Madison was unconvinced of the true effectiveness of a
written document claiming to protect the rights of individuals because expe-
L, dissenting).
114. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1233.
115. See Robinson, 116 S. Ct. at 1702.
116. See id. at 1702-03.
117. See JANE MCCoNNELL & BURT McCoNNELL, PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 34 (1970).
118. See Wallaee v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
119. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in I LETTERS AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 424 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott
1865) [hereinafter I LErrERS OF MADISON].
120. Madison believed the Republican form of government inherently protected the citizens against gov-
ernmental oppression as both political and physical power was vested in the people. What power the govern-
ment did possess had been consented to by the people. See id. at 425.
121. See id.
122. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in I LETTERS OF MADISON,
supra note 119, at 352-53.
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rience had revealed a propensity of citizens to violate unpopular written procla-
mations." After all, the document is merely paper which a powerful majority
could freely choose to disregard.'24 Beyond being relatively powerless, a writ-
ten document could easily be misconstrued as enumerating the only rights held
by individuals."z In the end, Madison set aside his own doubts and appre-
hension and vowed his support for inclusion of a Bill of Rights in order to win
ratification by the states and advance the union."a
1. Virginia Passage of Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom
Madison's role in the passage of the Religious Clauses is no less notewor-
thy than his prominence in the development and passage of the Constitution. In
Virginia, following Thomas Jefferson's departure to France as foreign minis-
ter,"z Madison carried through Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious
Freedom" which disestablished the Anglican church. 29 Passage of this bill
was possible because of Madison's astute political maneuvering which effec-
tively killed a separate bill intended to broaden a tax levy supporting Christian
ministers. 30 In 1785, during consideration of the levy, Madison published an
essay, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,' which
argued against taxation in support of the church and greatly swayed the popular
sentiment of Virginia.'32
2. Congressional Passage of the First Amendment
With the prominence of the Virginia debates and the leadership he provid-
ed therein, Madison found himself at the forefront of the religious debate in the
First Congress.' As promised to the states, consideration of amendments be-
123. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 1 LErrERs OF MADISON,
supra note 119, at 424.
124. See id. at 427.
125. See id. at 424.
126. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
127. Jefferson left for France on July 5, 1784, and returned to the United States on November 23, 1789.
See 1 NATHAN SCHACHNER, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A BIOGRAPHY 263, 384 (1951).
128. See Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in the United States, 47 OHIO ST. LJ. 409, 410-
11 (1986). Originally drafted by Jefferson, the lengthy declaration is contrasted with the brevity of the reli-
gious clauses of the First Amendment and reads in portion:
We the General Assembly of Virginia do enact that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support
any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or
burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer, on account of his religious opinions or
belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument maintain, their opinions in matters
of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.
ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 250
(1988) (emphasis added).
129. See Laycock, supra note 128, at 410.
130. See id. at 410-11.
131. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance is reprinted in full in the appendix following Justice
Rutledge's dissent in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63-73 (1947).
132. See Laycock, supra note 128, at 410-11.
133. See CORD, supra note 128, at 4-6.
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gan during the summer of 1789.'13  Perhaps reflecting his opinion that the
omission of a Bill of Rights was not a "material defect," Madison seemed
somewhat passive concerning his own proposals.' 31 Justice Rehnquist, dissent-
ing in Wallace v. Jaffree,'36 noted this passivity by commenting that
"Madison's subsequent remarks ... were less those of a dedicated advocate of
the wisdom of such measures than those of a prudent statesman seeking the
enactment of measures sought by a number of his fellow citizens."
' 37
Although little documentation of the debate concerning the Religious
Clauses exists,'38 the intended meaning of the clauses can be ascertained
through examination of the various changes to the proposal as it moved toward
approval by Congress. Numerous state versions of Religious Clauses were sub-
mitted for consideration.' 39 Virginia's version stands out, however, as current
Establishment Clause law relies upon Virginia's debates. Reflecting similar
proposals by North Carolina,'" New York, and Rhode Island,'4' the relevant
portion of the Virginia proposal read: " [N]o particular religious sect or society
ought to be favored or established, by law, in preference to others.' 42
Madison's own proposal stated as follows: "The civil rights of none shall
be abridged on account of religious beliefs or worship, nor shall any national
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in
any manner, or on any pretext, infringed."'43 Many transformations ensued.
After submission to committee,'" Madison's version became "no religion
shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be in-
fringed."'45 During House debate Madison revealed that "he apprehended the
meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and
134. See Laycock, supra note 128, at 411.
135. While recognizing the prominent role Madison certainly played in the construction and development
of the amendments which compose the Bill of Rights, then-Justice Rehnquist contended that in advancing
proposals for the Religious Clauses to the Federal Constitution Madison was "speaking as an advocate of
sensible legislative compromise, not as an advocate of incorporating the Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty
into the United States Constitution." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 97-98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
136. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). The case involved an Alabama moment-of-silence statute for school children.
Despite legislative language intended to convey an idea of neutrality upon the statute, the Supreme Court
majority ruled the statute unconstitutional because voluntary prayer was expressly included among the choices
of actions which could be taken during the one-minute time period. See id. at 60-61.
137. Id. at 93-94 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
138. The only documentation concerning the debates surrounding the Religious Clauses is from the House
on August 15, 1789. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 95. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. See CORD, supra note 128, at 6-7.
140. North Carolina and Rhode Island were the only two states that failed to vote in favor of ratification
of the United States Constitution because of the omission of a bill protecting individual rights. See Jaffree,
472 U.S. at 93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
141. The proposal by New York and Rhode Island differed only slightly from Virginia's by stating "no
religious sect or society" rather than "no particular religious sect or society." Id. at 93 n.2; see CORD, supra
note 128, at 7.
142. 3 DEBATES ON THE ADOIMON OF THE FEDERAL CONSTTTON 659 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1937).
143. History of Congress, Amendments to the Constitution (June 1789), reprinted in I ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS 434 (Joseph Gales, ed., 1834).
144. This was a Select Committee consisting of eleven members including Madison. See Jaffree, 472 U.S.
at 95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
145. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 143, at 729.
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enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in
any manner contrary to their conscience."'" While agreeing with Madison's
understanding of the proposed amendment, one congressman expressed his
concern that the words of the amendment may become "extremely hurtful to the
cause of religion" because "others might find it convenient to put another con-
struction upon it."" We are further given an insightful notation into the is-
sues Madison intended to confront through the Religious Clauses: "He believed
that the people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine
together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to con-
form."'" Eventually the House version emerged reading: "Congress shall
make no law establishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to
infringe the rights of conscience." 49
Because Senate debates were kept secret, no documentation of its discus-
sions exists.'50 Eventually, the Senate altered the House version to read: "Con-
gress shall make no law establishing articles of faith or a mode of worship, or
prohibiting the free exercise of religion."'5 A joint conference was then held
which turned out the final version utilized today in our First Amendment:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof."'5
3. Religious Accommodation Surrounding First Amendment Passage
Considering the divergence of information available, commentators have
succeeded at interpreting such information in directly conflicting manners.'53
Strict separationists have traditionally relied upon the writings of Madison and
Jefferson and the debates surrounding Virginia's struggle for religious liberty to
conclude that an impregnable wall must be maintained between church and
state.' 4 Meanwhile, despite the relatively small amount of known debate sur-
rounding the passage of the First Amendment, many have interpreted a more
narrow stance of accommodation by noting actions taken by the First Congress
and early presidents, including Jefferson and Madison.'
Numerous events have been cited by commentators in support of accom-
modation. For example, the day after House passage of the First Amendment
Religion Clauses, a resolution was offered in the House asking President Wash-
146. Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
147. See id.
148. Id. at 731.
149. Id. at 766.
150. See Laycock, supra note 128, at 412.
151. CHESTER JAMEs ANTtEAU Er AL., FREEDoM FROM FEDERAL ESTABIISHMENT 130 (1964).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
153. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); CORD, supra note 128. But cf. Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 620-26 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring); Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
154. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-16, 28-43 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
155. See generally CORD, supra note 128; Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 397-401 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673-78 (1984); Jaffree,
472 U.S. at 91-114 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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ington to proclaim a day for public prayer and thanksgiving.'56 Subsequently,
George Washington, John Adams, and James Madison issued Thanksgiving Day
Proclamations with Thomas Jefferson as the lone dissenter among the first four
presidents.'57
Similarly, Congressional chaplains are often cited as another accommoda-
tion of religion made by the First Congress.'58 The citation of congressional
provision for chaplains becomes even more noteworthy when pointing out that
Madison himself sat on the committee that recommended the Congressional
Chaplain system, yet he acquiesced making no argument of constitutional viola-
tion. 9 And finally, early presidents often effected direct support of religion
through Senate treaty agreements."e In particular, President Thomas Jefferson
signed a treaty agreement with the Kaskaskia Indians to provide money in sup-
port of a Roman Catholic priest and church for the Indian tribe"'-a treaty
which reflected those made by earlier and future presidents. 62 Such actions of
accommodation as these, and others," by the authors of the Religious Claus-
es provide foundation for narrower interpretation than currently acknowledged,
and cast doubt on the themes of strict separation between church and state and
strict neutrality between religion and irreligion set forth by the Supreme Court
in Everson v..Board of Education.'"
156. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 100-01 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157. See id. at 103. Jefferson believed the proclamation to be violative of the Constitution and asserted
that the timing of religious exercises such as prayer and fasting was better left to the choice of the people. See
id. Madison issued such Thanksgiving Day Proclamations four times. See CORD, supra note 128, at 53. Even-
tually, after leaving the presidency, Madison recanted the constitutionality of these proclamations and the
constitutionality of congressional chaplains in his "Detached Memoranda." See id. at 29-36.
158. See CORD, supra note 128, at 23-24.
159. See id. at 23.
160. See id at 57-80.
161. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 103 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
162. In addition to Jefferson's treaty, George Washington, James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Andrew
Jackson, and Martin Van Buren, along with their Senates, also made similar treaty agreements providing
public money for the building of churches. See CORD, supra note 128, at 58-60.
163. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632-36 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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B. "Wall of Separation''I"
For nearly 150 years, the Supreme Court reviewed the Establishment
Clause conflict only twice.s It was not until 1947, in Everson v. Board of
Education,67 that the Court made the first detailed analysis and declaration as
to its interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
Everson involved an alleged violation of the Establishment Clause by New
Jersey's statutory policy empowering local school districts to make agreements
for the transportation of children between school and home.'68 Based upon the
power granted by the statute the defendant township passed a resolution provid-
ing reimbursement of parental expenditures for travel by their children upon
buses of the public transportation system. 69 This authorization for reimburse-
ment was limited to transportation to and from public and parochial
schools. 7
The majority ruled in favor of the township, finding no violation of the
First Amendment because the expended tax dollars did not directly support the
parochial schools.' This decision is truly ironic in that it came from the very
Court which sought to ensure a "high and impregnable" wall between church
and state.'" Despite being a 5-4 decision, the Everson Court was unanimous
in its opinion that the First Amendment erected a wall between church and
state." Subsequently, Everson has been credited with establishing the
165. The words "wall of separation" originated from a January 1, 1802, letter written by President Jeffer-
son to the Danbury Connecticut Baptist Association, and the relevant paragraph stated:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that he owes
account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach
action only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
People which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a wall of separation between church
and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation on behalf of the rights of
conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore
to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.
CoRD, supra note 128, at 114-15 (emphasis from original). Jefferson's words concerning separation of church
and state were first given in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879). Reynolds, in part, dealt with
the constitutionality of a federal law directed toward the Mormon Church by outlawing bigamy. However,
unlike Everson, use of Jefferson's quote concerning the wall of separation between church and state was di-
rected toward the Free Exercise Clause rather than the Establishment Clause. See CORD, supra note 128, at
119.
166. See CoRD, supra note 128, at 103-05. Neither Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), nor Reuben
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), engaged in any meaningful analysis of the Establishment Clause.
167. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
168. See id. at 3.
169. See id.
170. See id. at 20 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The resolution provided for reimbursement for students of
public and Catholic schools only. By this limitation any students who had attended private, Baptist, or any
other sectarian school would not have received compensation for travel to and from school. See id. at 19-20.
For the Court which proclaimed the need for a "high and impregnable" wall separating church and state, this
seems to be a somewhat contradictory result by upholding a clearly sectarian favoritism through local govern-
ment dollars. The dissent, as would be expected, also found the majority's holding perplexing in light of the
stated conclusions of law. See id. at 19.
171. See id. at 18.
172. See id. The majority opinion concluded, "The First Amendment has erected a wall between church
and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach." Id.
173. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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separationist viewpoint of Establishment Clause jurisprudence; however, the
four dissenting justices were the true proponents of strict separation. The dissent
viewed the ruling as a step backward in allowing religious and governmental
action to intermingle." In reaching a conclusion, the majority set the stage by
reflecting upon practices of oppressive government supported churches in Eu-
rope which began to arise in early America.'75
Both the majority and dissenting opinions then interpreted the Establish-
ment Clause through the words of Jefferson and Madison in the Virginia de-
bates to reach their conclusions of a required neutrality by the government
toward religion and a wall of separation between church and state.7 6 Follow-
ing the Everson opinion, it became the standard in Establishment Clause cases
to cite the Virginia debates, especially Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance,
in support of the strict separationist position.'"
Beyond the importance of the decision itself as the first detailed interpreta-
tion of the Establishment Clause by the Supreme Court, Everson was likewise
monumental for its application of the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.' Prior to Everson and the Fourteenth Amendment, the religious
protections of the United States Constitution only applied against actions by the
federal government, more specifically to actions of Congress. Originally, the
states maintained control over what individual protections to provide their citi-
zens against state governmental actions. In fact, some states continued the prac-
tice of recognizing an official state church following ratification of the Federal
Constitution, with the final state church being disestablished as late as 1833.'
However, Everson's application of the Fourteenth Amendment made the Estab-
lishment Clause a uniform ground floor provision throughout the country, al-
lowing states to provide additional, but not less, protection.'80
174. Justice Jackson stated, "I cannot read the history of the struggle to separate political from ecclesiasti-
cal affairs ... without a conviction that the Court today is unconsciously giving the clock's hands a backward
turn." Id. at 28 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
175. See id. at 8-11.
176. See id. at 11-13; id. at 31-42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
177. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428, 431 n.13 (1962).
178. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8. See also CoRD, supra note 128, at 99-101.
179. The Congregational Church was maintained in Connecticut until 1818, in New Hampshire until
1819, and in Massachusetts until 1833. See CORD, supra note 128, at 4.
180. The Everson Court asserted this new standard by stating, "The First Amendment, as made applicable
to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment ... commands that a state 'shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."' Everson, 330 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added).
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Following Everson, the Court heard monumental cases concerning
prayer' and Bible reading"' in public schools. The Court neglected to pro-
vide any definitive rule of interpretation regarding Establishment Clause. It was
not until 1971, in Lemon v. Kurtzman," that the Court put forth a list of cri-
teria by which to determine the constitutionality of a government action involv-
ing religion.
C. The Lemon Test and Its Resulting Unpredictability
In Lemon, the majority announced a tripartite test intended to clarify Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence and thereby provide a uniform rule of review."4
The test required that a government activity: (1) have a secular purpose; (2)
have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
and (3) must not involve excessive entanglement of government with reli-
gion.'85 For governmental activity to withstand judicial scrutiny, each prong of
the tripartite Lemon test must be met, and failure on any of the three prongs
results in a finding of unconstitutionality under the Establishment Clause."86
The Lemon test failed to produce predictable results from the day of its
inception, and incoherence mixed with confusion has resulted ever since."
On the same day of the Lemon decision, the Court divided over application of
the third prong of the Lemon test' in Tilton v. Richardson."9 The disagree-
ment finally resulted in a splintered opinion as mutual agreement could not be
reached among any five of the nine justices."
The subsequent confusion and inconsistent opinions 9' stemming from
application of Lemon have resulted in a broad range of criticism by commenta-
tors and the Court." Some commentators seeking strict separation lay blame
181. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
182. See School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
183. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
184. See id. at 612-13.
185. See id. The first two prongs were taken from the Court's earlier decision in Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), and the Court adopted the third prong from Walz v. Tax Commission, 397
U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
186. See Robinson v. City of Edmond, 68 F.3d 1226, 1229 (10th Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1702
(1996).
187. See infra note 191.
188. See CORD, supra note 128, at 199-200.
189. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
190. See id.
191. Then-Justice Rehnquist best described these inconsistencies by noting:
For example, a State may lend to parochial school children geography textbooks that contain maps of
the United States, but the State may not lend maps of the United States for use in geography class. A
State may lend textbooks on American colonial history, but it may not lend a film on George Wash-
ington, or a film projector to show it in history class. A State may lend classroom workbooks, but
may not lend workbooks in which the parochial school children write, thus rendering them
nonreusable. A State may pay for bus transportation to religious schools but may not pay for bus
transportation from the parochial school to the public zoo or natural history museum for a field trip.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110-11 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
192. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397-401 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655-57 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 107-13 (Rehnquist, J.,
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not on flaws within the test itself, but rather on the Supreme Court's application
and recent alterations of the three prong test. 93 They contend that strict appli-
cation of the test would result in uniform and consistent decisions by conform-
ing to the absolute separationist interpretation set forth in Everson.""
Conversely, numerous justices of the Supreme Court have criticized the
Lemon test from the point of view of accommodation."5 Even the author of
the majority opinion in Lemon, Chief Justice Burger, eventually warned against
rigid application and downplayed the role of the test by calling the elements
mere "signposts."'" Furthermore, Chief Justice Burger, presenting a metaphor
far different from that of a "high and impregnable" wall, seemed to credit the
confusion to the difficulty of the issue itself by stating that the Establishment
Clause provides only a "blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all
the circumstances of a particular relationship."'"
Following Lemon, the Court has reviewed some Establishment Clause
cases without direct reliance on the tripartite test, giving the appearance that
Lemon is beginning to fall from favor.9 However, when confronted with
governmental display of religious symbols, the Court continues to rely on Lem-
on with some modifications.' 99
dissenting). But see Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
463; Joshua D. Zarrow, Comment, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment Clause and Publicly Spon-
sored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U. L. REv. 477 (1986).
193. See generally, Gey, supra note 192; see Zarrow, supra note 192, at 515-16.
194. See Gey, supra note 192, at 533-34; Zarrow, supra note 192, at 515-16. Professor Gey consistently
argues that true religious liberty can only be secured through strict and absolute separation between church
and state thereby ensuring insulation of all religious viewpoints against government endorsement of any par-
ticular sect. See Gey, supra note 192, at 533-34.
195. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing difficulty
of applying Lemon); Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 108-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lemon's origins in
earlier Supreme Court cases which based their conclusions upon faulty interpretation of history surrounding
the Establishment Clause); Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736, 768-69 (1976)
(White, J., concurring) (criticizing inclusion of the third prong of the Lemon test).
196. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 89 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also warned against any
notion that an easy formula could be produced.
The Court's extended treatment of the "test" of Lemon... suggests a naive preoccupation with an
easy, bright-line approach for addressing constitutional issues. We have repeatedly cautioned that
Lemon did not establish a rigid caliper capable of resolving every Establishment Clause issue, but
that it sought only to provide "signposts."... In any event, our responsibility is not to apply tidy
formulas by rote; our duty is to determine whether the statute or practice at issue is a step toward
establishing a state religion.
Id. (citations omitted).
197. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
198. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); ; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228
(1982). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670-87 (1984) (upholding city display of a nativity scene
in Christmas setting), where Chief Justice Burger again warned against reliance on Lemon as the sole test for
Establishment Clause review and based the majority's holding on the context in which the city's nativity
scene was displayed and the traditional American history of accommodating and recognizing the diverse reli-
gious backgrounds of the citizens.
199. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984).
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D. Replacements for Lemon
Due to the instability and criticisms of the Lemon tripartite test, alterations
and replacements are being implemented and introduced by some justices of the
Supreme Court. The three most prominent suggestions have been Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test (or "reasonable observer"), Justice Kennedy's
psychological coercion test, and Justice Scalia's legal coercion test.
1. The Endorsement Test - "Reasonable Observer"
Justice O'Connor first introduced her endorsement test in a concurring
opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly. 0 In Lynch, the Court upheld the display of a
publicly owned creche 0' as part of an overall Christmas display in a private
park.' The proposed modification to the Lemon three-prong test attempted to
clarify application of the first two prongs by defining them as subjective and
objective questions."'a Justice O'Connor further modified the first two prongs
to focus on "endorsement or disapproval of religion" rather than focusing on
"secular purpose" and "advancement or inhibition of religion."' Therefore,
the "purpose" prong looks to whether the government intended to endorse or
disapprove religion, and the "effect" prong inquires, regardless of the
government's purpose, whether the action in fact conveys a message of govern-
mental endorsement or disapproval.' In the end, the proposed modifications
require judicial review of possible governmental entanglement with or en-
dorsement of religion.'
Justice O'Connor defends the endorsement test by asserting that it best
captures what she sees as the essential mandate of the Establishment
Clause-that government shall not make "adherence to a religion relevant in
any way to a person's standing in the political community." ' ° Her reasoning
then follows that governmental endorsement is the proper area of focus because
"[e]ndorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adher-
ents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.""5
In concurrence in County of Allegheny v. ACLU," 9 O'Connor stated the
issue to be whether a reasonable observer would view the action or symbol as a
200. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
201. The creche is the traditional Christmas nativity scene depicting the birth of Jesus Christ. See id. at
671.
202. See id. at 671-72.
203. See id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor justified use of both subjective and ob-
jective review on the grounds that some viewers would judge the government's intent based on context while
others inevitably would judge intent based on content. See id.
204. See id. at 690-92.
205. See id. at 691-92.
206. See id. at 689.
207. Id. at 687. See also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
208. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
209. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
1997]
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governmental endorsement of religion, or, in other words, "as a disapproval of
his or her particular religious choices."2"' This inquiry, however, continues the
trend of a heightened sensitivity to context, particularly in the area of religious
symbols.21' Under the endorsement test, context helps evaluate the reasonable
observer's perception of the challenged action or display, and a number of
considerations are taken into account including history, "the longstanding exis-
tence of practices," and the particular physical setting.2" Therefore, in Alle-
gheny, while ruling a creche standing alone in the county courthouse violated
the Establishment Clause, Justice O'Connor considered the display of a meno-
rah23 in front of a government building non-violative in light of its context
(display during the holiday season next to a Christmas tree).2"4 This context
negated any message of endorsement which could be perceived from the reli-
gious nature of the symbol."5
Although Justice O'Connor in her concurrence in Lynch noted that the
objective meaning in the community would guide review,216 at least one com-
mentator has asserted that the decisions of lower courts will vary according to
the identity given to the "objective observer" by each individual judge.2"7 If
the court desires a finding of constitutionality, the court may use an informed
observer who is familiar with the community's history, politics, and setting.2"8
However, if the court desires a finding of unconstitutionality, it may utilize a
simple passerby who "hypothetically has just stepped off the bus when he or
she observes the display."2 "
In the most recent case concerning display of religious symbols, Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette,' Justice O'Connor took nec-
essary steps to define the "reasonable observer" in order to avoid a divergence
of identities given by lower courts. Although the controversy involved the dis-
play of a cross by the Ku Klux Klan in the Capitol Square, an area designated
as a public forum, the Court dealt with the case on Establishment Clause
grounds rather than freedom of speech grounds.m' Again in concurrence, Jus-
tice O'Connor specified that "the endorsement test necessarily focuses upon the
perception of a reasonable, informed observer"' m and not that of a "casual
passerby." The "reasonable observer" of the endorsement test is analogous
210. Id. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
211. See id. at 629. See also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-80; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983).
212. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 630-31, 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
213. A candelabrum with a central candlestick and eight branches used as part of a lamp lighting ritual
celebrating the Jewish holiday Chanukah or Hanukkah. See id. at 583-85.
214. See id. at 637.
215. See id at 635-36.
216. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
217. See Gey, supra note 192, at 479-80.
218. See id. at 479.
219. Id.
220. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
221. The Court limited the ruling as the record and opinions of the lower courts only addressed the Estab-
lishment Clause issue. See id. at 2444-45.
222. Id. at 2452 (O'Connor, L, concurring) (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 2455. The dissent postulated a naive or "casual passerby" by asserting that a violation of the
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to an individual representing the "personification of the community ideal of rea-
sonable behavior, determined by the [collective] social judgment" 4 in tort
law. By defining the hypothetical observer as "informed," Justice O'Connor
recognized that there will always be someone who might perceive some govern-
ment action as endorsement of religion, however, "[a] State has not made reli-
gion relevant to standing in the political community simply because a particular
viewer of a display might feel uncomfortable."'T
2. The Coercion Tests
The coercion tests of Justices Kennedy and Scalia both originated from
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Allegheny.T Differing interpretations
of coercion subsequently surfaced, however, in Lee v. Weisman,' a case re-
viewing nonsectarian prayer at public school graduations. Justice Kennedy, in
the majority opinion, chartered a course for a psychological coercion test by
"protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure." H Accord-
ing to Justice Kennedy, governmental control over the graduation ceremony
resulted in subtle coercive pressure over students in the form of public pressure
and peer pressure to remain silent during the prayers. 9 While the psychologi-
cal coercion test prohibits direct and indirect coercion, Justice Scalia pro-
nounced his preference for a legal coercion test which prohibits only direct
coercion, or that which is "backed by threat of penalty. ' 'aso Whether or not the
psychological and legal coercion tests would result in differing outcomes con-
cerning religious displays or symbols is unclear, as the Allegheny dissent repre-
sents the only Supreme Court opinion discussing a coercion test in such an
area.
Despite the differences of opinion between the two justices, both perceive
Everson, Lemon, and strict separation as being hostile toward religion, and both
rely upon coercion as the proper test based upon original intent along with
historical or traditional governmental acknowledgment of the role of religion
throughout the history of American life."' In the Allegheny dissent, Justice
Kennedy specifically referred to the words of James Madison in which Madison
expressed his understanding of the Religion Clauses to prohibit Congress from
Establishment Clause occurs if "some reasonable observers would attribute a religious message to the State."
Id. at 2469-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. ld at 2455 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PRoSSER AND KEErON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)).
225. Id.
226. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also
American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 128-40 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissent-
ing); Michael W. McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 933
(1986) [hereinafter McConnell, Coercion]; Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroad, 59 U.
CM. L. REV. 115, 157-65 (1992) [hereinafter McConnell, Religious Freedom].
227. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
228. Id. at 592.
229. See id. at 593.
230. Id. at 640-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
231. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 658-60, 669-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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enforcing legal observation of religion by law or compelling worship contrary
to anyone's beliefs.z Similar use of words associated with "compulsion" or
"enforcement" are likewise found in documents, although typically relied on for
support of a strict separationist stance, such as Madison's Memorial and Re-
monstrance and Thomas Jefferson's Virginia Act for Establishing Religious
Freedom. 3 Relying on history and original intent, Justice Kennedy asserted
that the "great object" of the Religion Clauses is "[tihe freedom to worship as
one pleases without government interference or oppression." 4 Therefore, the
goal of the coercion tests is to attain this "great object" by "[b]arring all at-
tempts to aid religion through government coercion."s
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Establishment Clause
When considering the development of Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
one is struck by the fact that the first thorough interpretation of the Establish-
ment Clause by the Supreme Court was void of any reference to the debates
surrounding passage of the First Amendment. No serious analysis of the debates
or actions of the Framers was undertaken by any justice of the Court until
1985,"6 a full thirty-eight years after the Court's Everson decision. 7 Few
question the leading role Madison likely played in composing the amendments
constituting the Bill of Rights, however, despite claiming accordance with origi-
nal intent, the Everson Court relied on contentions and arguments by Madison
which were made outside the arena of Congress and then completely ignored
Madison's interpretation of the Religious Clauses which he expressed on the
House floor.s Jefferson, whom the Court relied on in creating the metaphor
of the "wall" separating church and state, was not a member of the First Con-
gress and not in the country at the time of drafting, debating, and adopting the
First Amendment. 9 "It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine
upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history.
')240
232. See id. at 660 (quoting ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 143, at 730).
233. Madison used statements such as "sanctions of a law," "not by force or violence," "force him to
conform," "compulsive support," and "attempts to enforce by legal sanctions." See McConnell, Coercion,
supra note 226, at 937-38. Similarly, the Virginia Act, written by Jefferson, used such terms as "compelled,"
"enforced," "restrained," and "burthened". See id. at 938. See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303
(1940) (Establishment Clause paraphrased as "forestall[ing] compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed
or the practice of any form of worship.").
234. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 660 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235. Id.
236. See McConnell, Coercion, supra note 226, at 937.
237. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
238. See CORD, supra note 128, at 121-22. Regardless of Madison's prior and subsequent expressions
which may reveal a separationist stance, the greatest weight should be given to the statements and opinions
which were actually made and presented on the House floor for debate. See McConnell, Coercion, supra note
226, at 937.
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The debates over the Religious Clauses provide merely a small glimpse
into the intent of the Framers. When considering the numerous acts of accom-
modation and acknowledgment following or surrounding passage of the First
Amendment, however, such analysis indicates a more narrow interpretation.
These acts of accommodation, especially those by Madison and Jefferson, can-
not be dismissed as mere "trivial breaches" or temporary "backsliding.""24
Consider, for example, that Jefferson's treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians, pro-
viding funds for support of a Catholic church and priest, was signed by Jeffer-
son in 1803-only one year after having written his infamous letter stating that
the Religion Clauses erected a wall separating church and state.242
The fundamental problem with Everson and Lemon is their mutually errant
interpretation of history. Similarly, the endorsement test completely lacks a
historical foundation in history.243 If truthfully applied, all three standards
would always result in a finding that traditional acts of governmental accommo-
dation or acknowledgment of religion are unconstitutional. Surely atheists gen-
erally perceive a message of endorsement or advancement of religion when
viewing traditional acts of acknowledgment such as Thanksgiving Day Procla-
mations, appeals to God in presidential speeches, legislative chaplains, and the
national motto.2 They thereby must feel less than full members of the politi-
cal community. Likewise, such governmental acts sharply conflict with the strict
separationist theme set forth in Everson and subsequently followed by the Su-
preme Court. While Justice O'Connor's proposed modification of the "reason-
able observer" in Capitol Square improves the endorsement test by narrowing
the scope, the coercion tests asserted by Justices Kennedy and .Scalia are the
only tests which coincide with the history and tradition of accommodation and
acknowledgment of the prominent role of religion among the American people.
B. Robinson v. City of Edmond
At the time of appeal in Robinson, Establishment Clause jurisprudence
concerning religious displays or symbols was principally governed by Lynch
and Allegheny.245 In Lynch, the Court, hesitantly relying on Lemon, found that
display of a city owned creche did not violate the Establishment Clause when
241. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616, 625 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter attempts to
explain away these "breaches" by asserting that they "prove only that public officials, no matter when they
serve, can turn a blind eye to constitutional principle." Id. at 616 n.3. He then forgives Madison for his
"backsliding" over Thanksgiving Day Proclamations and acquiescence over legislative and military chaplains
by relying on Madison's "Detached Memoranda," a document written by Madison following his retirement
from public life. See id. at 624-25. Justice Souter does at least confront the transitions in the wording of the
Religious Clauses through congressional consideration, however, he then relies heavily on Madison's Memori-
al and Remonstrance and "Detached Memoranda," documents written before and after ratification respective-
ly. See generally id. at 620-26. Notably missing from Justice Souter's opinion are Madison's words during
debate on the House floor. See generally id.
242. See CORD, supra note 128, at 114-16.
243. See McConnell, Religious Freedom, supra note 226, at 154-55.
244. 36 U.S.C. §186 (1988) ("In God we trust.").
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perceived in the context of the holiday season and upon consideration of histor-
ical acknowledgment of the role of religion in America." Similarly, in Alle-
gheny, the Court upheld the display of a menorah on public property based
upon the context of the holiday season and the overall display of which includ-
ed secular symbols of the season.' 7 Therefore, stare decisis requires that re-
view take into consideration the history, context, and overall setting of the dis-
play.
In holding the Edmond city seal unconstitutional, the Tenth Circuit ignored
the mandate of Lynch and Allegheny. First, despite Edmond's history of being
the location of the first church established in the Oklahoma Territory, the court
held that the history of a community may not be honored by display of a sec-
tarian symbol. 4s However, in both Lynch and Allegheny, the sectarian nature
of the symbols was not determinative to a finding of unconstitutionality, as both
displays were upheld. Similarly perplexing is the appellate court's refusal of
Edmond's history argument on grounds that such an argument "could always
'trump' the Establishment Clause, because of the undeniable significance of
religion and religious symbols in the history of many of our communities.'249
This holding contradicts the Court's continued reliance on history and the role
played by religion to justify allowance of governmental accommodation and
acknowledgment of religion." Essentially, when concerned with governmen-
tal seals, the Tenth Circuit allows local governments to honor their history, but
the role of religion is required to be ignored.
Second, although acknowledging the relevancy of the context and setting
of the seal, the court refused to consider "the secular or non-secular nature of
other elements of the seal."'" In rejecting the City's attempt to distinguish the
Edmond seal from the seal in Friedman,"a regardless of obvious differences
between the two seals, the court declined to rule that some religious images are
permitted while other religious images are not, simply based on the nature of
the other elements included in the display." However, this has not been the
case for the Supreme Court as revealed by comparing the holdings of Lynch
and Allegheny where one display of a creche was upheld while the other was
found violative of the Establishment Clause. 4 In Allegheny, the Court cited
inclusion of secular symbols as the primary distinguishing factor between the
246. See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670-87 (1984).
247. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 629-36 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
248. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1232.
249. Id.
250. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 632-36 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 630-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 669-74 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100-04 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.. dissenting); Lynch, 465 U.S. at
673-78; Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784-96 (1983).
251. Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1233.
252. The relevant seal displayed a Latin cross emanating rays of light as the main symbol. See supra text
accompanying notes 84-92.
253. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1233.
254. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (creche violative of Establishment Clause);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding display of creche).
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displays relevant to the two cases.ass By refusing to take into account the oth-
er secular symbols included in the Edmond seal, the Tenth Circuit focused its
attention primarily on the depiction of the cross. As noted by Chief Justice
Burger, "[flocus exclusively on the religious component of any activity would
inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause. '
Finally, the Robinson court stated application of an objective standard
when perceiving the seal through the eyes of an average observer, but then
relied on testimony of one witness to determine the message conveyed by the
crossas7 The court quoted testimony given in Friedman where "[a] rabbi testi-
fied that the seal suggested to him that there was an 'officialness' about Chris-
tianity."" Rather than reflecting the standard set forth by the Supreme Court
which looks to the "'objective meaning... in the community,"' "ss such reli-
ance on testimony of one individual more closely resembles a subjective stan-
dard of review contrary to established precedent.
This errant application of the "reasonable observer" could have been avoid-
ed by applying O'Connor's clarifications given in Capitol Square."° Unfortu-
nately, Robinson and Capitol Square were decided around the same time period
and the "reasonable, informed observer" was not utilized."s The clarifications
given by Justice O'Connor potentially could have resulted in a different out-
come for the Edmond seal because the informed hypothetical observer "must be
deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which
the religious display appears."'a Furthermore, the subjective views of one, or
even a few, are not determinative, as "the endorsement inquiry is not about the
perceptions of particular individuals or saving isolated non-adherents from the
discomfort of viewing symbols of a faith to which they do not subscribe. ' '"a
Immediately following the adoption of the Declaration of Independence a
committee was formed, consisting of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, and
Thomas Jefferson, to select a seal for the newly formed country.' One sug-
gestion, although obviously not adopted, included Jefferson's proposal for half
of the seal to depict "the children of Israel in the wilderness led by a cloud by
day, and a pillar by night."' 65 By depicting the children of Israel, Jefferson
intended to memorialize a "favorite contention of the settlers ... that they were
255. See Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 596-98.
256. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680.
257. See Robinson, 68 F.3d at 1230.
258. Id. (quoting Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs of Bernalillo County, 781 F.2d 777, 781 (10th
Cir. 1985)).
259. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 220-25.
261. Robinson was decided less than four months after Capitol Square.
262. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2455 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
263. Id. Four months following Robinson, the Tenth Circuit followed the Capitol Square holding in
Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1830 (1996), where the court
upheld the national motto, "In God we trust," as not violating the Establishment Clause.
264. See GILBERT CmNARD, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE APOSTLE OF AMEuCANSM 86 (2d ed. 1975).
265. Id. The other half was to depict "Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs, from whom we claim the
honor of being descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have assumed." Id.
19971
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a chosen people." 6 Similar to Jefferson's proposal, the City of Edmond
chose to memorialize its unique history, which also included a prominent role
played by religion, yet Jefferson's proposal to depict the children of Israel
would certainly find the same plight as that which befell Edmond's seal if it
were subjected to the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of the Establishment Clause.
C. Ramifications
The primary legal concern for local communities facing the prospect of
potential constitutional challenges is costs. As for Edmond, altering the seal to
comply with the Robinson ruling has resulted in a cost to the City of more than
$40,000.' Although plaintiffs' attorney sought over $192,000 in attorney
fees, the district court eventually required the City of Edmond to pay a total fee
of $105,721.m
Numerous other city seals in Oklahoma likewise portray religious symbols
which could become subject to judicial review,' 9 and at least one city already
faces a potential challenge." The Robinson decision does not bode well for
the eventual fate of official seals depicting religious symbols because, unlike
the Fifth Circuit decision in Murray, t' the Tenth Circuit turned a blind eye to
arguments of history, context, and setting. However, the introduction of the
"reasonable, informed observer" does suggest a narrower interpretation of the
Establishment Clause than that applied in Robinson.
V. CONCLUSION
The inconsistencies and uncertainties in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
originated with the Everson decision. By ignoring the debates surrounding pas-
sage of the First Amendment the Supreme Court announced a theme of absolute
separation between church and state which fails to comport with traditional
governmental accommodation and acknowledgment of the role of religion in
American history. Everson also established the unfortunate metaphor of an
"impregnable wall" which has only served to mislead and confuse the courts
and thereby the citizenry.
Subsequently, the Lemon tripartite test, with its origins in the Everson
decision, thoroughly confuses Establishment Clause jurisprudence. The Tenth
Circuit's holding in Robinson presents a perfect example of the need for clarifi-
266. ld.
267. See Susan Parrott, Cross Battle Costs Edmond $105,721 Fee, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Oct. 17,
1996, at 1.
268. See id.
269. The seals of Oklahoma City, The Village, Del City, Luther, Bethany, and Shawnee all contain some
form of religious symbol. See Edmond Cross Ruling, supra note 29, at 1.
270. A retired Methodist minister has requested a redesign of the city seal of Bethany, Oklahoma, because
reference to "Southern Nazarene University," a local university, is included. See Christy Watson, Religious
Link On Bethany Seal Prompts Debate, THE DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 8, 1996, at 1.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 67-74.
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cation and adoption of new criteria with firmer foundation in history and origi-
nal intent. The endorsement test would be an improvement, but it likewise
suffers from lack of historical support. Meanwhile, the coercion tests offer
grounding in historical fact and a far clearer guideline for lower courts, the
citizenry, and governmental entities. Regardless of which test finds greater
support among the justices, the Supreme Court would make great strides toward
clarification of Establishment Clause jurisprudence by distancing itself from
Everson and expressly rejecting the Lemon tripartite test. However, the Court
appears content to simply allow Lemon to slowly fade from usage. Until all
vestiges of Lemon disappear, confusion will reign. Communities such as
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